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Abstract
We study how cognitive abilities correlate with behavioral choices by col-
lecting evidence from almost 1, 200 subjects across eight experimental projects
concerning a wide variety of tasks, including some classic risk and social pref-
erence elicitation protocols. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has been
administered to all our experimental subjects, which makes our dataset one of
the largest in the literature. We partition our subject pool into three groups
depending on their CRT performance. Reflective subjects are those answer-
ing at least two of the three CRT questions correctly. Impulsive subjects are
those who are unable to suppress the instinctive impulse to follow the intu-
itive -although incorrect- answer in at least two 2 questions. The remaining
subjects form a residual group. We find that females score significantly less
than males in the CRT and that, in their wrong answers, impulsive ones are
observed more frequently. The 2D-4D ratio, which is higher for females, is
correlated negatively with subjects’ CRT score. We also find that differences
in risk attitudes across CRT groups crucially depend on the elicitation task.
Finally, impulsive subjects have higher social (inequity-averse) concerns, while
reflective subjects are more likely to satisfy basic consistency requirements in
lottery choices.
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1 Introduction
There is a growing literature that studies the link between various aspects of
socio-economic behavior, such as risk, time, or social preferences, and proxies of
cognitive ability of various formats. These measures vary from school and college
performance, such as the Grade Point Average (GPA, Kirby et al., 2005), college en-
try standardized test scores, such as GRE or SAT (Dohmen et al., 2010; Chen et al.,
2013), up to more customized protocols, from the classic IQ test (Borghans et al.,
2008b) to the Wonderlic test, aimed at assessing problem-solving ability (Ben-Ner
et al., 2004).1 All these contributions stress the importance of individual hetero-
geneity, with specific reference to cognitive abilities, as a fundamental factor to
understand and predict individual and social behavior.
Cognitive ability is also a fundamental component of all theories that advocate
a dual and parallel cognitive deliberation process (Evans, 1984; Kahneman, 2011):
one (“System 1”, or intuitive, heuristic. . . ) fast, automatic, associated with a low
cognitive load, the other (“System 2”, or controlled, analytic. . . ) more cognitively
demanding. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT hereafter, Frederick, 2005) illus-
trates the interaction between these two cognitive processes. It is a simple test of a
quantitative nature especially designed to elicit the “predominant cognitive system
at work”, either 1 or 2, in respondents’ reasoning:
CRT1. A bat and a ball cost 1.10 dollars. The bat costs 1.00 dollars more than
the ball. How much does the ball cost? (Correct answer: 5 cents).
CRT2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets? (Correct answer: 5 minutes).
CRT3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would
it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? (Correct answer: 47 days).
The beauty of the test is that, to each question, is associated an immediate,
“impulsive”, answer (10, 100 and 24, respectively) that, although incorrect, may be
1The Wonderlic test consists of 50 questions in the areas of math, vocabulary, and reasoning
and its score is positively correlated with various measures of intelligence (Hawkins et al., 1990).
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selected by those subjects who do not think carefully enough. As Frederick (2005, p.
27) puts it,“. . . the three items on the CRT are easy in the sense that their solution
is easily understood when explained, yet reaching the correct answer often requires
the suppression of an erroneous answer that springs “impulsively” to mind”.
Frederick (2005) shows that CRT performance significantly correlates with risk
and time preferences: more reflective subjects are, on average, less risk-averse and
more patient. Recent studies also document that the CRT is associated with sub-
jects’ gender-specific exposure to testosterone (Bosch-Dome`nech et al., 2014). In
addition, it helps to explain some classic biases in behavioral finance, such as the so-
called “base rate fallacy” (Bergman et al., 2010; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011; Oechssler
et al., 2009; Alos-Ferrer and Hu¨gelscha¨fer, 2015; Noussair et al., 2014; Kiss et al.,
2015; Insler et al., 2015).
The CRT has also gained attention for the fact that, contrary to other proxies of
cognitive abilities such as the SAT or the Wonderlic Test, females score significantly
less than males. This stylized fact has been established in a wide variety of studies
(Frederick, 2005; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011; Oechssler et al., 2009) and is also
confirmed by the evidence reported in this paper.
It may be worth highlighting that the CRT provides not only a measure of
cognitive abilities, but also of impulsiveness and, possibly, other individual unob-
servable characteristics. For instance, the number of correct answers in the CRT
has been shown to be positively correlated with numerical literacy, mathematical
skills, and various psychological dimensions (Morsanyi et al., 2014; Toplak et al.,
2011; Borghans et al., 2008a). This means that the CRT alone cannot reveal the
cognitive and psychological mechanisms underlying individual heterogeneity in eco-
nomic behavior. For instance, it is possible that subjects performing high in the
CRT are closer to risk neutrality because they are less impulsive or because they
better understand the decision problems at stake. This is why, in this paper, we look
closely at the relationship between CRT performance and physiological, psycholog-
ical and socio-demographic characteristics (Section 3). In addition, we also relate
CRT scores to alternative measures of cognitive ability, such as financial literacy
and consistency in risky choices (Section 6).
In the last five years, the CRT has been administered to the participants in eight
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experimental studies, both at LaTEx and CESARE, the experimental labs of the
Universidad de Alicante and LUISS Guido Carli in Rome, respectively, for a total of
nearly 1,200 observations (see Section 2 for a detailed description). To get directly
into the discussion around which this paper is built, Figure 1 reports the distribution
of CRT answers of our compound dataset. As Figure 1 shows, in none of the cases
the modal response corresponds to the correct answer. Instead, the mode (10, 100
and 24, respectively) is always associated with “the erroneous answer that springs
impulsively to mind”. In this respect, our evidence is perfectly in line with what is
reported in the literature: for all three questions, the impulsive (System-1) responses
are much more frequent than the reflective (System-2) ones (Gill and Prowse, 2015).
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Figure 1: CRT answers distributions.
Figure 1 also shows that the response distribution is not completely polarized be-
tween these two answers: there are also alternatives -neither reflective, nor impulsive-
that are selected by a non negligible fraction of individuals. These subjects’ answers
fall short with respect to the dichotomy “reflective-impulsive” along which the dis-
cussion on CRT performance has often focused upon (see, e.g., Frederick, 2005;
Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel, 2012).
In order to further investigate this issue, this paper puts forward an additional
index, labelled as iCRT, which is meant to measure cognitive “impulsiveness” by
means of the same three CRT questions:
iCRT = 1(CRT1 = 10) + 1(CRT2 = 100) + 1(CRT3 = 24),
where 1(.)=1 if condition (.) is satisfied, and 0 otherwise. By analogy with the
standard CRT score, an index from 0 to 3 that counts the number of correct answers
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in the CRT, our iCRT is meant to measure the inability to suppress the erroneous
intuitive answer, which in our view provides as important information as the CRT
score in characterizing our subject pool. As our previous discussion suggests, we
expect females to have, on average, higher iCRT scores, but additional behavioral
dimensions need to be explored.
Panel A in Figure 2 reports the distribution of CRT scores disaggregated by
gender. The mode is zero for both genders, but the fraction of females who fail
the three questions is much higher than the corresponding fraction of males. By
the same token, males’ average CRT score is significantly higher (1.12 vs. 0.58, p
< 0.001), while the opposite holds for the iCRT score (1.46 vs. 1.93, p < 0.001).
However, there is also a significant fraction of subjects (19% of our pool) who score
“low” (i.e., not more than 1 correct answer) in both CRT and iCRT, thus suggesting
that cognitive (ir-)reflection does not seem to fully explain their cognitive processing.
These considerations yield the partition of Panel B, where subjects are assigned to
one of three categories, depending on whether: i) they scored 2 or more in the CRT
(“Reflective”), ii) they scored 2 or more in the iCRT (“Impulsive”), or iii) they
scored poorly in both tests (≤ 1, “Residual”). As we see from Panel B of Figure
2, while the first two groups have a strong gender component, the latter distributes
across genders almost equally.
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Figure 2: Panel A: CRT score frequencies by gender. Panel B: CRT groups by
gender.
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The remainder of this paper follows the basic layout of Frederick (2005), in that
we provide additional evidence on risk aversion, gender differences, or the relation
between CRT and alternative proxies of cognitive ability, around which the original
debate on cognitive reflection has been developing over the last 10 years. In addition,
we enrich the discussion along less explored dimensions, such as social preferences.
More specifically, Section 2 provides a brief description of the structure of our
dataset and the associated experimental projects. Section 3 correlates CRT scores
with subjects’ observable characteristics grouped into three broad categories: phys-
iological, psychological and socio-demographic. We find that the large gender differ-
ence in CRT performance is significant even after including a large number of these
individual controls.
Sections 4 and 5 use our behavioral evidence to look into the link between cog-
nitive reflection and risk and social preferences, respectively. As for the former,
we show that the negative correlation between CRT performance and risk aversion
crucially depends on the elicitation protocol, thus confirming the evidence in An-
dersson et al. (2013). As for the latter, we find that our CRT partition uncovers
novel evidence on the relation between cognitive reflection and social preferences:
impulsive subjects have greater (inequity averse) distributional concerns than the
other two groups.
In Section 6 we relate CRT performance to alternative measures of cognitive
ability. Here we find that reflective subjects are more likely to satisfy some basic
“consistency” requirements in their lottery choices and have, on average, higher
grades at college (Frederick, 2005). Finally, Section 7 concludes, followed by an
Appendix containing supplementary empirical evidence.
2 Data and methods
We collect data from eight experimental studies carried out at the Laboratory of
Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx) of the Universidad de Alicante
and the Center for Experimental Studies At Rome East (CESARE) of LUISS Guido
Carli in Rome, from 2009 to 2015. The objects of interest include risk and social
preferences, mechanism design and behavioral finance. All experimental protocols
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are also endowed with a computerized debriefing questionnaire.2
2.1 Individual characteristics
Table 1 summarizes the structure of our dataset. The behavioral content of
the 8 projects is divided into two broad categories: (IND)ividual and (STR)ategic,
depending on the nature of the experimental environment. As we shall report in
sections 4 and 5, this paper is mainly devoted to establishing a link between cognitive
reflection and individual (as opposed to strategic) behavior, the latter being studied
elsewhere, or still in progress (see Section 7 for a “sneak preview” of our preliminary
results).
Subjects’ individual characteristics are grouped into three broad categories: phys-
iological, psychological and socio-demographic. Subjects took the CRT test, without
monetary incentives, within the debriefing questionnaire.3 Physiological measures
include scanned pictures of both hands, from which we compute the second-to-fourth
digit ratio (2D:4D hereafter) following the procedure of Neyse and Bran˜as-Garza
(2014).4 It has been shown that 2D:4D correlates negatively with prenatal expo-
sure to testosterone (Manning et al., 1998). The relationship between 2D:4D and
several individual characteristics, such as risk aversion, competitiveness, prosocial
preferences, cognitive ability or career choices has been extensively studied in the
literature (Apicella et al., 2008; Coates et al., 2009; Sapienza et al., 2009; Pearson
and Schipper, 2012; Bosch-Dome`nech et al., 2014).5
As for subjects’ psychological characteristics, we use a reduced version of the “Big
Five” personality inventory (Benet-Martinez and John, 1998; John and Srivastava,
1999). In its various forms, the Big Five questionnaire is among the most relied-upon
measures of personality in psychology (see, e.g., Digman, 1990; John et al., 2008).
2All experiments were computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In all projects, the
debriefing questionnaire was administered at the end of the experiment, with the exception of
Project 6, in which it was administered at the beginning.
3The order in which the 3 CRT questions are presented is always the same, as in Frederick
(2005).
4After scanning participants’ hands, digit length was measured with a ruler, whose measure-
ment precision is 0.5 millimeters.
5Figure B1 in the Appendix shows the distribution of 2D:4D in our sample. We have also
collected self-assessed subjects’ height and weight, from which we have derived the associated
Body Mass Index (BMI). As it turns out, BMI has never been found a significant factor in all
the statistical exercises contained in this paper and, therefore, has been dropped from the set of
regressors.
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It measures personality according to five broad dimensions, or “traits”: Openness,
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism.6 The Big Five
test has received increasing attention by economists as a useful tool in explaining
heterogeneity in individual preferences (Borghans et al., 2009; Daly et al., 2009),
academic achievement and labor market performance (Barrick and Mount, 1991;
Judge et al., 1999; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Zhao and Seibert, 2006; Heckman
et al., 2006; Borghans et al., 2008a; Heckman and LaFontaine, 2010).
Proj. Reference Obs. IND/ Topic Quest 2D:4D BIG5 Risk Soc. Fin.
STR pref.s lit.
1 Ponti and Carbone (2009) 48 IND Herding Yes No Yes MPL No No
2 Di Cagno et al. (2014) 192 IND Risk/soc. preferences Yes No No N/A N/A No
3 Del Pozo et al. (2013) 192 IND Risk/soc. preferences Yes No No RLP Yes No
4 Ponti et al. (2014b) 336 STR Entrepreneurship Yes Yes Yes MPL Yes No
5 Ponti et al. (2014a) 192 IND Risk/Time preferences Yes No No N/A N/A No
6 Ferrara et al. (2015) 32 STR Public good/sleep depr. Yes No No RLP Yes No
7 Albano et al. (2014) 92 STR Procurement auctions Yes No No No No No
8 Cueva et al. (2014) 96 STR Behavioral finance Yes Yes Yes MPL No Yes
Obs. 1,180 1,180 432 480 704 560 96
Table 1: Structure of the meta-dataset
Among the set of socio-demographics, we use Family education, a dummy vari-
able that is positive if either parent holds a university degree and languages, another
dummy variable that is positive if the subject is fluent in more than two languages.7
2.2 Behavioral evidence
With regards to the behavioral evidence, this paper focuses especially on risk and
social preferences, which are elicited in 5 and 3 studies of our dataset, respectively.
Risk preferences. Subjects’ risk attitudes have been elicited either by means
of a Random Lottery Pair protocol (RLP, Projects 3 and 6) or a Multiple Price List
protocol (MPL, Projects 1, 4 and 8).8
The RLP protocol consists of a sequence of 24 binary choices between lotteries
involving four fixed monetary prizes (0, 5, 10 and 15 Euro). Lotteries are selected
from Hey and Orme (1994) original design. Our MPL protocol consists of a sequence
6See Table B1 in the Appendix for details.
7Information on languages spoken is only available for Spanish students. Our study was con-
ducted in a bilingual region of Spain. Thus, we wanted to measure whether a subject was fluent
in any other language in addition to Spanish and Catalan.
8In the analysis of Section 6 we drop the evidence from Projects 1 and 6 because the former
employs hypothetical payoffs and the latter has insufficient observations.
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of 21 binary choices. Option A corresponds to a sure payment whose value increases
along the sequence from 0 to 1000 pesetas.9 Option B is constant across the sequence
and corresponds to a 50/50 chance to win 1000 pesetas. For both MPL and RLP, one
of the binary choices is selected randomly for payment at the end of the experiment.10
Social preferences. The data analyzed in this paper are taken from Project 4
and consist of a sequence of 24 distributional decisions borrowed from Cabrales et al.
(2010). Individuals are matched in pairs and must choose one out of four options.
An option corresponds to a pair of monetary prizes, one for each subject within
the pair. Then, one of the two individuals is chosen randomly to be the “dictator”,
whose decision is implemented for the pair. This is the so-called “Random Dictator”
protocol (Harrison and McDaniel, 2008).11
3 CRT and individual characteristics
Table 2 reports mean values of individual characteristics for each CRT group. It
also provides p-values from Kruskal-Wallis tests whose null hypothesis is that each
individual characteristic follows the same distribution across the three CRT groups.12
As Table 2 shows, subjects belonging to different CRT groups vary significantly with
respect to gender, 2D:4D, Neuroticism, Openness and Agreeableness.13
3.1 Physiological
We begin by looking at our two physiological measures, gender and 2D:4D. As we
know from Figure 2, both CRT scores and groups have a strong gender component,
with the exception of the residual group. As a consequence, the distributions of both
CRT scores and groups are significantly different across gender (Mann-Whitney U
9It is standard practice, for all experiments ran at LaTEx, to use Spanish Pesetas as experi-
mental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it mitigates integer problems,
compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for example). On the other hand, although Span-
ish Pesetas are no longer in use (substituted by the Euro in the year 2002), Spanish people still
use Pesetas to express monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a real (as
opposed to an artificial) currency, we avoid the problem of framing the incentive structure of the
experiment using a scale (e.g., Experimental Currency) with no cognitive content.
10Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the user interfaces of the MPL and RLP protocols.
11The user interface for the distributional decisions is shown in Figure A2 in the Appendix.
12The Kruskal-Wallis test is a multiple-sample generalization of the Mann-Whitney U-test
(Kruskal and Wallis, 1952). Tables B2 and B3 in the Appendix present further mean values
and tests disaggregated by gender.
13We also consider grades and financial literacy later in the paper (see Section 6).
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Mean Kruskal-Wallis
N. obs.
Reflective Impulsive Residual P-value
Female 0.324 0.583 0.538 <0.001*** 1,178
Left hand 2D:4D 0.970 0.981 0.987 0.015** 431
Right hand 2D:4D 0.967 0.978 0.981 0.064* 432
Neuroticism 0.435 0.507 0.483 0.009*** 479
Extraversion 0.582 0.608 0.565 0.175 479
Openness 0.725 0.697 0.655 0.009*** 479
Agreeableness 0.694 0.685 0.639 0.022** 479
Conscientiousness 0.689 0.688 0.671 0.485 479
N. languages > 2 0.440 0.368 0.387 0.462 432
Family educ. 0.311 0.296 0.387 0.377 432
Table 2: Mean values of individuals’ characteristics by CRT groups and p-value of
the Kruskal-Wallis test.
test, p = 0.001 and Chi-square test, p < 0.001, respectively).
Figure 3 plots mean 2D:4D for each CRT score and group. As Figure 3 shows,
2D:4D is lowest for men and women with maximum CRT scores and, consequently,
for those subjects belonging to the reflective group. This relationship seems stronger
for males: Kruskal-Wallis tests reject the null hypothesis of no difference in left
hand 2D:4D across CRT scores and groups for males (p = 0.034 and p = 0.050,
respectively), but not for females (p = 0.217 and p = 0.668). With respect to right
hand 2D:4D, Kruskal-Wallis tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of no difference
across CRT scores and groups for both males (p = 0.096 and p = 0.365, respectively)
and females (p = 0.297 and p = 0.494).
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Figure 3: CRT and 2D:4D with 95% confidence intervals. Panel A (B): LH (RH)
2D:4D and CRT. Panel C (D): LH (RH) 2D:4D and CRT groups.
Our finding that males score significantly higher than females in CRT adds
further support to the existing literature (Frederick, 2005; Oechssler et al., 2009;
Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2012; Bosch-Dome`nech et al., 2014). Fewer studies have ex-
plored the relationship between 2D:4D and cognitive ability. Bran˜as-Garza and
Rustichini (2011) measure performance in the Raven Progressive Matrices task, a
test of abstract reasoning ability and find -consistently with us- a negative and signif-
icant correlation between 2D:4D and Raven test scores for males and no significant
correlation for females. Bosch-Dome`nech et al. (2014) study the correlation between
2D:4D and CRT scores and find a negative and significant correlation, particularly
with the right hand 2D:4D. However, in contrast with our findings, their correlation
is stronger for females.
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3.2 Psychological
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of some ordered logit regressions in
which Big Five scores (interacted with gender) are included in the set of independent
variables. As Table 3 shows, in all regressions, Neuroticism and Extraversion are
statistically significant.14 There are no significant interactions between gender and
personality traits in our regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Left Hand Right Hand
2D:4D -0.181 -0.152 -0.191 -0.220** -0.190* -0.148
(0.111) (0.113) (0.148) (0.104) (0.105) (0.135)
Female -1.117*** -1.028*** -0.973*** -1.111*** -1.020*** -0.939***
(0.205) (0.209) (0.312) (0.206) (0.210) (0.315)
Family education 0.0690 0.0397 -0.0568 0.0652 0.0357 -0.0553
(0.202) (0.205) (0.272) (0.204) (0.206) (0.273)
Languages 0.441** 0.439** 0.606** 0.437** 0.434** 0.613**
(0.201) (0.204) (0.271) (0.201) (0.205) (0.272)
Project 8 -0.228 -0.247 -0.275 -0.253 -0.267 -0.296
(0.220) (0.230) (0.242) (0.223) (0.232) (0.244)
Neuroticism -0.235** -0.257* -0.237** -0.268**
(0.100) (0.131) (0.0998) (0.131)
Extraversion -0.198** -0.262* -0.198** -0.261*
(0.101) (0.139) (0.100) (0.140)
Openness 0.175 0.110 0.172 0.109
(0.114) (0.162) (0.114) (0.164)
Agreeableness -0.0287 -0.0443 -0.0340 -0.0593
(0.114) (0.127) (0.114) (0.128)
Conscientiousness -0.0682 -0.108 -0.0636 -0.0966
(0.106) (0.151) (0.106) (0.150)
Female*2D:4D 0.122 -0.101
(0.234) (0.227)
Female*Family education 0.206 0.200
(0.420) (0.424)
Female*Languages -0.382 -0.421
(0.414) (0.417)
Female*Neuroticism 0.0502 0.0599
(0.209) (0.210)
Female* Extraversion 0.183 0.165
(0.207) (0.206)
Female*Openness 0.189 0.163
(0.242) (0.242)
Female*Agreeableness 0.0125 0.0529
(0.249) (0.255)
Female*Conscientiousness 0.135 0.123
(0.216) (0.217)
Observations 431 431 431 432 432 432
Table 3: Ordered Logit estimates of the number of correct answers to CRT.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All explanatory variables except female, languages, family
education and project are standardized. *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Borghans et al. (2008a) examine the impact of personality traits on scores in var-
ious cognitive tests, including CRT, in a sample of 128 students. Consistently with
us, they find that Extraversion is negatively related with the probability of answer-
ing correctly. In their data, Openness correlates positively with CRT, whereas in
14The regressions of Table 3 only consider observations from Projects 4 and 8, since these are
the only ones in which we have collected data on the Big Five test.
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our regressions the coefficient on Openness is also positive, but not significant. Sim-
ilarly, Neuroticism is negatively correlated (although, in their data, the estimated
coefficient is not significant).
3.3 Socio-demographic
The regressions of Table 3 include two socio-economic indicators: whether the
subject speaks more than two languages and whether at least one parent holds a
university degree. Controlling for other variables, speaking more than two languages
turns out to be significant, whereas family education is not. Fluency in more than
two languages very likely indicates a relatively high socio-economic status in Spain,
where the average student is unlikely to be fluent in more than two languages without
additional family investment in private education.
3.4 CRT: nature or nurture?
We have used biological, psychological and socio-economic measures as indepen-
dent variables in our CRT regressions. Our findings that both gender and 2D:4D
correlate significantly with CRT, together with those reported in Bran˜as-Garza and
Rustichini (2011) and Bosch-Dome`nech et al. (2014), lend support to the idea that
physiological factors (i.e., nature) may affect CRT performance. In contrast, the
significant effect of languages also suggests that educational investment (i.e., nur-
ture) matters. However, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship here because
cognitive ability and intrinsic motivation might themselves affect a subject’s ability
to learn new languages.
Finally, we also found certain psychological measures to be correlated with CRT.
Even though the relative importance of biological and social determinants of person-
ality is less clear, evidence suggests substantial heritability in Big Five scores. For
instance, twin studies have estimated that genetic influence can account for around
50% of the variance in Neuroticism or Extraversion (Loehlin, 1992; Jang et al., 1996;
Loehlin et al., 1998).
To quantify the effect of our explanatory variables on CRT scores, we predict
the probability of having zero correct answers to CRT for different subgroups in our
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sample.15 The probability that males answer zero questions correctly is 0.47, con-
trolling for all other covariates, whereas females have a probability of 0.70. Subjects
with right hand 2D:4D one standard deviation below average have a probability of
0.56 of having zero correct answers, whereas those with 2D:4D one standard devia-
tion above average have a probability of 0.60. A score one standard deviation above
rather than below average in Neuroticism leads to a 9% difference (0.61 and 0.56,
respectively). Similarly, a score one standard deviation above rather than below av-
erage in Extraversion leads to a 7% difference (0.60 and 0.56, respectively). Finally,
subjects speaking more than two languages are 13% less likely to have zero correct
answers to CRT than those who do not (0.53 vs 0.62).
In sum, our results highlight the large gender difference in performance in CRT
that remains after controlling for other individual variables: females are almost 50%
more likely than males to answer all CRT questions wrong. Variations in personality
scores or in the digit ratio of two standard deviations led to much more moderate
changes in the predicted probability of giving zero correct answers in CRT (7-9%).
Finally, our evidence suggests that educational investment (as proxied by the number
of languages spoken) could play a more important role than the psychological and
physiological characteristics considered here.
4 CRT and risk preferences
We now turn our attention to our behavioral evidence, starting with the analysis
on how cognitive reflection relates with risk attitudes. As we already discussed in
Section 2, we rely on two different choices formats: RLP and MPL. Contrary to
MPL, in RLP lotteries are neither ordered with respect to their associated prof-
itability (proxied by the expected return), nor with respect to their associated risk
(proxied by the variance). Instead, the presentation of each lottery pair is artificially
manipulated, precisely to control for possible order effects.
15We use the estimates in column (5) of Table 3. Remember from Figure 2 that the modal
number of correct answers to CRT is zero for both males and females.
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Figure 4: Relative frequency of risky choices in RLP and in MPL data by CRT
group, with 95% confidence intervals. Panel A and C (B and D): full sample (by
gender).
Panel A in Figure 4 displays the relative frequency of “risky” choices in RLP,
where the latter are identified by the higher-variance lottery within the pair. Panel B
shows the same information disaggregated by gender. These results confirm, by and
large, the commonplace in the literature, that is, that higher cognitive reflection is
associated with lower risk aversion (Donkers et al., 2001; Frederick, 2005; Benjamin
et al., 2013). More precisely, Panel A shows that reflective are less risk averse than
impulsive, while the difference between reflective and the residual group seems less
important. In addition, Panel B in Figure 4 shows that, once we split our subject
pool by gender, females tend to be more risk averse than males within the same
CRT group. Besides, for men there are no significant differences in risk aversion
across groups, while for women it is higher for reflective group than for the others.
This evidence suggests that both cognitive ability and gender play an important role
in explaining subjects’ risk attitudes.
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Panel C in Figure 4, displays the relative frequency of risky choices in MPL
(i.e., the lottery that yields a 50-50 chance to get all or nothing) for those subjects
whose behavior satisfies minimal “consistency conditions”, that will be explained
and discussed in Section 6.2. Panel D shows the same information disaggregated by
gender.
As Panel C shows, aggregate behavior of all CRT groups is almost identical.
However, when we disaggregate by gender, we see that risk aversion slightly decreases
moving from the reflective to the residual group for males, while this pattern is
exactly reversed for females. We also observe that the relative frequency of risky
choices for reflective subjects is the same for males and females, although females’
choices have higher variability.
There is a caveat here. The summary statistics of Figure 4 neglects relevant
features of the underlying economic decisions at stake. When selecting a lottery,
subjects most likely compare the profitability of each decision, not simply its asso-
ciated risk. Put differently, the relative frequency of risky choices does not char-
acterize precisely the economic trade-off underlying both the RLP and the MPL
decisions. For this reason, we test the robustness of the preliminary evidence of Fig-
ure 4 by estimating, by maximum likelihood, subjects’ individual Constant Relative
Risk Aversion parameter, ρ, where subjects’ choices are assumed to maximize the
expected value of the utility function u(x) over monetary prizes x in equation (1),
where higher ρ is associated with higher risk aversion (Andersen et al., 2008).
u(x) =
x1−ρ
1− ρ, ρ 6= 1, (1)
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients using RLP (MPL) data on the left
(right) panel, respectively. As for the RLP data (left panel) the estimated coefficients
are always are greater than zero and highly significant, which shows that risk aversion
is the representative preference for all CRT groups. When we test for the differences
in risk aversion across CRT groups, the p-values at the bottom of the table show
that it is only significant between reflective and impulsive subjects. When we test
for the differences across CRT groups by gender, we find that the overall difference
between reflective and impulsive subjects is mainly driven by females. We also find
15
a significant difference between reflective and residual females that is hidden in the
aggregate estimations.16
As for the MPL data (right panel), the p-values at the bottom of Table 4 show
that, at the aggregate level (first column), differences in risk aversion across CRT
groups are not significant, thus confirming the preliminary evidence in Figure 4. The
same result also holds when we disaggregate by gender, suggesting that the trends
we observe in Figure 4 are not statistically significant.
Random lottery pairs (RLP) protocol Multiple price list (MPL) protocol
All Males Females All Males Females
Reflective (R) 0.508∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗
(0.023) (0.029) (0.035) (0.054) (0.063) (0.113)
Impulsive (I) 0.571∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.068 0.296∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.031) (0.016) (0.045) (0.064) (0.058)
Residual (RS) 0.502∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.103 0.264∗∗
(0.047) (0.080) (0.031) (0.078) (0.081) (0.128)
P-val R = I 0.012∗∗ 0.512 0.081∗ 0.643 0.117 0.538
P-val R = RS 0.914 0.297 0.065∗ 0.667 0.323 0.801
P-val I = RS 0.154 0.179 0.592 0.914 0.709 0.806
Obs.s 4,608 2,184 2,424 3,969 2,184 1,785
Table 4: Structural estimation of risk aversion (ρ) using data from RLP and MPL
protocols.
Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. P-values are from t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the difference in risk aversion
between two CRT groups is equal to zero.
5 CRT and Social Preferences
The relationship between cognitive ability and social preferences is, to some
extent, yet to be explored. Chen et al. (2013) find that subjects who perform better
in the Math portion of the SAT are more generous in both the Dictator game and in a
series of small-stakes dictatorial decisions known as Social Value Orientation (SVO).
In contrast, Ben-Ner et al. (2004) find that the performance in the Wonderlic test
is weakly and negatively correlated with giving, especially for females.17 Benjamin
16The sign and significance of risk aversion estimated parameters and their differences by CRT
groups in Table 4 are unchanged if the female dummy is added as independent variable, as shown
in Table C1 in the Appendix. The same holds if estimates are obtained by using linear regressions,
as shown in Table C2.
17The Wonderlic test score is positively correlated with various measures of intelligence (Hawkins
et al., 1990). See footnote 1 for its definition.
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et al. (2013) find, instead, that school test scores are not correlated with giving.
Somewhat related, Hauge et al. (2009) study the relationship between attitudes to
giving in different pro-social tasks (e.g., charitable giving, Dictator Games, etc. . . )
and “cognitive load”, which they measure by asking subjects to memorize numbers
of 7 digits, some of which are easy (hard) to remember, e.g., 1111111 or 1234567
(9325867 or 7591802). They find that the correlation between cognitive load and
giving is small.
Our distributional data are drawn from Project 4 and consist of a sequence of de-
cisions over four monetary payoff pairs in which the identity of the best-paid player
is constant across choices. Since choices are not naturally ordered, we provide some
descriptive evidence of this experimental environment by introducing an ad hoc in-
dex, borrowed from Project 6, which measures the share of the pie allocated to the
Dictator (conditional on the specific round choice set):
EgoIndex(k) =
xD(k)−min(xD(h))
maxh(xD(h))−minh(xD(h)) , (2)
where xD(k) denotes the monetary payoff allocated to the Dictator according
to option k. In other words, if the Dictator gives him/herself the maximum (min-
imum) prize available (regardless of what the Recipient obtains), the value of the
EgoIndex(.) is 1 (0), respectively.
Figure 5 reports descriptive statistics of the distribution of EgoIndex, disaggre-
gated by CRT group and gender. It shows that impulsive (especially female) subjects
have higher distributional concerns, with no noticeable difference between reflective
and residual subjects. However, we cannot exclude that differences in distributional
concerns by CRT group are driven by differences in subjects’ ability, in the light
of the positive correlation between CRT performance and achievement in ability or
school tests observed in the literature.
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Figure 5: EgoIndex by CRT group, with 95% confidence intervals. Panel A (B):
full sample (by gender).
Before assessing the empirical content of this preliminary evidence, notice that,
by analogy with what we have just discussed for risky choices, Figure 5 captures the
economic trade-off underlying Dictators’ decisions only partially, as it is calculated
looking at the Dictator’s payoffs only, and not at the Recipient’s. This contrasts with
the common view which models social preferences by measuring relative comparisons
between the Dictator’s and the Recipient’s payoffs.
For this reason, we test the robustness of the preliminary evidence of Figure
Figure 5 by estimating, by maximum likelihood, the classic Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model of social preferences, according to which the Dictator’s utility associated with
option γ, u(γ), not only depends on her own monetary payoff, xD(γ), but also on
that of the Recipient, xR(γ), as follows:
u(γ) = xD(γ)− αmax {xR(γ)− xD(γ), 0} − βmax {xD(γ)− xR(γ), 0} , (3)
where the values of α and β determine the Dictator’s envy (i.e. aversion to inequal-
ity when receiving less than the Recipient) and guilt (i.e., aversion to inequality
when receiving more than the Recipient), respectively.18 We estimate α and β by
using a multinomial logit model in which the utility associated with the Dictator’s
choice of allocation, γ, follows equation (3). We obtain the estimates by maximum
18Our data format seems ideal to identify envy and guilt, in that the identity of the best (worst)
paid agent is constant across options.
18
likelihood and by clustering standard errors at the subject level.
All Male Female
α β α β α β
Reflective (R) 0.116∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗ 0.125** 0.521∗∗∗ 0.0995 0.578∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.053) (0.051) (0.083) (0.096)
Impulsive (I) 0.295∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 0.272*** 0.728∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.789∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.037) (0.047) (0.062) (0.049) (0.045)
Residual (RS) 0.237∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.130* 0.415∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.087) (0.078) (0.101) (0.107) (0.123)
Obs. 8,064 8,064 4,152 4,152 3,912 3,912
P-val. R = I 0.003∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.042*** 0.012∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.052∗
P-val. R = RS 0.176 0.626 0.955 0.369 0.162 0.582
P-val. I = RS 0.441 0.068∗ 0.124 0.009∗∗∗ 0.835 0.357
Table 5: Social preferences by CRT group: Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s structural
estimation.
Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. P-values are from t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the difference in risk aversion
between two CRT groups is equal to zero.
The estimates in Table 5 are all positive and significant across the three CRT
groups, indicating inequity aversion (i.e., positive envy and guilt) as the predom-
inant behavior (Cabrales et al., 2010). Our estimates also show highly significant
correlation between our CRT partition dummies and the model’s estimated coef-
ficients: when we test pairwise differences in the estimates between CRT groups
(see bottom of Table 5), we find that impulsive subjects have higher distributional
concerns than reflective ones, (p = 0.003). In addition, we find that they are also
weakly more guilty than the residual group (p = 0.068), and this is mostly driven
by males’ behavior (p = 0.009).19
The observed differences in social preferences by CRT group, particularly be-
tween reflective and impulsive subjects, can be rationalised by the prediction that
dual cognitive systems drive individuals’ decisions (Kahneman, 2011). This is sup-
ported by evidence that subjects with high CRT score are less inclined to behavioural
biases than those with low CRT (Bergman et al., 2010; Hoppe and Kusterer, 2011;
Oechssler et al., 2009) and by related evidence that subjects’ altruism is correlated
with their 2D:4D (Bran˜as-Garza et al., 2013).
In a companion paper, Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara (2014) use data from Project
19The sign and significance of social preferences estimated parameters and their differences by
CRT groups in Table 5 are unchanged if the female dummy is added as independent variable, as
shown in Table C3 in the Appendix.
19
2 on a Linear Dictator Game of 98 subjects and condition the estimates of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) model one the same CRT group partition used in this paper.
They also find that inequality aversion is typical of impulsive subjects in “standard”
Dictator Games (where Dictators’ and Recipients’ payoffs are negatively related).
By contrast, reflective subjects are associated with negligible social concerns, with
the exception of a higher unconditional altruistic attitude, i.e., negative envy and
positive guilt, in situations where the Dictator’s payoff is held constant.
6 Is CRT another rationality test ?
In this section we study whether CRT scores and groups are related with mea-
sures of “consistency” associated with subjects’ behavior in the experiments, as well
as alternative proxies of subjects’ cognitive ability. As for the former, our indicators
of consistency are related with the lottery choices in RLP and MPL experiments.
As for the latter, we consider two additional measures of cognitive ability: educa-
tional achievement and financial literacy. Even though these two measures may
depend on many factors, we follow Frederick (2005)’s intuition that certain aspects
of cognitive ability, such as reading comprehension and mathematical skills, may aid
performance in CRT and are likely to correlate with educational achievement and
financial literacy, too.
6.1 Consistency in lottery choices
In this section we test whether cognitive reflection is related with subjects’ con-
sistency across lottery choices by using both MPL and RLP data. As for MPL, a
“consistent” subject is defined as one whose choices satisfy these conditions:
1. She should always choose Lottery B (A) in Decision 1 (21) in the sequence.
This condition is due to first-order stochastic dominance.
2. She should switch from Option B to Option A only once in the sequence. This
is due to monotonicity and transitivity.
This joint condition partitions our subject pool into two subgroups of (in)consistent
subjects, respectively. In a similar vein, another proxy for consistency can be de-
20
rived by counting the number of switches observed for any given individual, with
“inconsistency” growing with the number of switches.
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Figure 6: Consistent subjects in lottery choices by CRT group, with 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 6 shows the relative frequency of consistent subjects by CRT group for
the full sample (Panel A) and by gender (Panel B). As Figure 6 shows, about 90%
of reflective subjects are consistent. This frequency falls to 75% for the other two
groups. The 95% confidence intervals in Figure 6 show that reflective subjects
are significantly more consistent than any of the other groups, while the difference
between the other two subgroups is not significant. Also notice that we do not
observe significant gender differences in consistency within each CRT group.
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Figure 7: Number of switches in lottery choices by CRT group and gender, with
95% confidence intervals.
Figure 7 shows distribution of mean switches for the full sample (Panel A) and
by gender (Panel B). By analogy with Figure 6, the number of switches for the
reflective group is significantly smaller than those of the the other two groups, for
which we do not detect a significant difference. Again, we do not detect significant
gender differences within each CRT group.20
Also RLP data provide a relatively straightforward consistency test, in that
there are two decisions (out of 24) in which lotteries can be ranked by first-order
stochastic dominance. In this respect, “consistent” subjects should never go for the
dominated lottery, independently on their degree of risk aversion, ρ, and -actually-
for a much broader family of behavioral models of choice under risk than expected
utility maximization. Looking at our RLP data, we found that no reflective subject
(out of 33) is inconsistent according to our definition, while we found 4 (out of 128,
3%) within the impulsive group and other 4 (out of 31, 13%) within the residual
group. To Mann-Whitney standards, these differences are significant, except that
between reflective and implulsive.21
To summarize, our data clearly show that reflective (residual) subjects are more
(less) likely to act consistently in our lottery tasks, respectively, with no detectable
20Table C4 in the Appendix reports Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests for pairwise comparisons
across CRT groups, both for the full sample and by gender. Table C5 reports the same tests for
gender differences. Results are in line with those reported here.
21Incidentally, among the 8 inconsistent subjects, there are 5 males and 3 females.
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gender effect.
6.2 Grades and financial literacy
Extensive evidence documents that educational achievement is positively cor-
related with labor market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006). Similarly, financial
literacy has been shown to correlate with stockholding (Christelis et al., 2010) and
is an increasingly important objective in high school curricula (Mandell and Klein,
2009).
Dependent variable: number of correct answers in the CRT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA 0.019* 0.022** 0.010 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023)
Female -1.141*** -1.447***
(0.200) (0.473)
Financial Literacy 0.573** 0.312
(0.240) (0.265)
Observations 432 432 96 96
Table 6: CRT, GPA and financial literacy.
Ordered Logit estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
We borrow Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) test of financial literacy, which consists
of 3 questions on subjects’ general knowledge of financial markets. Consistently with
Frederick (2005), the ordered logit estimates in Table 6 show that the GPA coefficient
-which we measure using subjects’ grades at university from 0 to 100- is statistically
significant. Also financial literacy is also positively and significantly correlated with
CRT. However, after controlling for gender the effect is no longer significant. It
seems that the aggregate correlation between CRT and financial literacy is driven
by the fact that females in our sample have lower financial literacy.22
7 Discussion
Overall, our results confirm a strong gender component in CRT performance.
With regards to other individual characteristics, we find significant, although quan-
titatively much smaller, correlations between CRT and 2D:4D, personality traits
and family education.
22After performing Mann-Whitney test for gender differences, we find that financial literacy is
significantly lower for females (z = 3.588, p-value = 0.0003)
23
We have also studied whether cognitive reflection is correlated with risk and
social preferences. Our structural estimations with RLP data show that reflective
subjects tend to be less risk averse than impulsive ones, especially for females. By
contrast, MPL data show no significant difference by CRT group or gender, in line
with the criticism of Andersson et al. (2013).23 As for social preferences, impulsive
subjects are more envious and guilty than reflective ones, and impulsive males are
more guilty than the residual group, while females are not. This evidence comple-
ments the findings in Ponti and Rodriguez-Lara (2014) who employ the Dictator
Game data of Project 2 and find that, once again, impulsive subjects are those
whose behavior markedly differs from that of the other two groups (again, in the
direction of inequity aversion).
Finally, we have studied the correlation between cognitive reflection and alterna-
tive proxies of cognitive ability. Here we have found that reflective subjects are more
likely to satisfy basic consistency requirements in their lottery choice, in contrast
with the other two groups (especially, the residual), which are, instead, more prone
to violate such conditions. In line with Frederick (2005), we have also found that
academic performance (GPA) is positively correlated with CRT. Similar consider-
ations hold for financial literacy, which is also correlated with CRT. However, in
this case, the effect seems to be uniquely driven by the underlying gender difference.
Additional experimental sessions seem required to increase the low sample size and
obtain more robust evidence with respect to this result.
As mentioned in the introduction, it is worth emphasizing that CRT provides
not only a measure of cognitive ability, but also of impulsiveness. Furthermore, our
analysis shows that it is significantly correlated with various individual character-
istics, as well as with alternative measures of cognitive ability and literacy. This
leaves the interpretation of our results regarding CRT and economic behavior some-
what open. Of course, one possibility would be to incorporate further explanatory
variables in the analysis, allowing us to examine which factors captured by CRT
turn out to explain individual heterogeneity in behavior. For example, it would be
interesting to check whether the correlation between risk aversion and CRT holds
23See also Charness et al. (2013); Filippin and Crosetto (2014) for a discussion of the relative
advantages and disadvantages of different risk elicitation protocols.
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after controlling for financial literacy, or whether its association with social prefer-
ences remains after the inclusion of personality traits and alternative measures of
rationality. Unfortunately, the structure of our data is such that we do not have
enough observations to perform these types of tests.
By the same token, the observed gender difference in CRT scores remains open
to interpretation. The existing literature agrees on a strong gender difference in
CRT but, to the best of our knowledge, does not provide an explanation for this
finding. Our own evidence as well as that of earlier studies (e.g. Frederick, 2005;
Bosch-Dome`nech et al., 2014) suggest that this difference remains after controlling
for a number of individual characteristics such as personality, education, prenatal
exposure to testosterone, mathematical ability, etc. One important factor that has
received limited attention in the literature regards the incentive structure under
which the test is administered, that is, whether or not subjects are rewarded for each
correct answer. This could be important if females turn out to have less intrinsic
motivation to perform well in this test.24
We have only found a few studies that compare CRT performance by gender,
checking whether the test is incentivized or not. Oechssler et al. (2009) look at CRT
with incentives and find an average score of 2.2 for males and 1.7 for females. Hoppe
and Kusterer (2011) also look at CRT with incentives and find scores of 2.12 and
1.61 for males and females, respectively. On the other hand Bosch-Dome`nech et al.
(2014) look at CRT without incentives and find average scores of 0.95 and 0.58 for
males and females, respectively. These latter figures are much closer to ours (1.08
and 0.55 for males and females, respectively) than the rest of the cited references,
which suggests that gender differences in performance may be reduced when the CRT
is incentivized.
We conclude by recalling that this paper exploits the richness of our dataset
only partially, with particular reference to our behavioral data, in that it focuses on
individual decision tasks (mainly related with risk and social preferences).
The link between cognitive reflection and behavior in strategic environments is
being studied elsewhere (take, for example, projects 1, 2, 4, 6 or 7). For instance,
24One possible reason for females’ lower intrinsic motivation may be that they perceive the CRT
as a male task.
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Ponti and Carbone (2009) find a negative correlation between CRT scores and the
level of noise of subjects’ play in an experimental model of informational cascades,
while Ponti et al. (2014b), within the setting of a simple principal-agent model with
moral hazard, show that reflective principals offer higher wages, which, in turn,
yield higher effort levels and profits. By the same token, reflective agents exert
more effort, which also results in higher expected profits in the experiment.25
Moving to a rather different behavioral domain, Ferrara et al. (2015) find that
sleep deprivation makes reflective subjects more likely to choose riskier lotteries and
induce a more altruistic behavior. By contrast, Albano et al. (2014) do not detect
significant differences across CRT groups in both winning probabilities or expected
profits in an experimental procurement auction. A more detailed study to relate
such a dispersed evidence is currently under way.
25More evidence on the interaction between CRT performance and strategic behavior can be
found in other articles of this special issue. Benito-Ostolaza et al. (2015), for example, find that
high scoring subjects in the Raven‘s test play more strategically in coordination games. Jones et al.
(2015) find that high-CRT people tend to reciprocate more in the second round of the classical
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Baghestanian and Frey (2014) find that high-CRT GO players tend to be
more cooperative in a series of classical games. Lohse (2015) finds that high-CRT people contribute
more in a classical one-shot public good game. Interestingly, this effect disappears when they have
little time to make their decisions.
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Appendix A
Panel A
Panel B
Figure A1: Panel A: user interface of the RLP (Project 3). Panel B: user interface
of the MPL (Projects 4 and 8).
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Figure A2: Distributional task, user interface.
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Appendix B
Personality trait Definition
Openness Being open to new ideas and intellectually curious, imaginative,
nonconforming, unconventional an autonomous
Neuroticism Tendency to experience psychological distress, exhibit poor emo-
tional adjustment and experience negative affects, such as anxiety,
insecurity and hostility
Agreeableness Tendency to be compassionate, cooperative, trusting, compliant,
caring and gently
Conscientiousness Tendency to show control and self-discipline, is comprised on two
related facets: achievement and dependability
Extraversion Pronounced engagement with outside world, it represents the ten-
dency to be sociable, assertive, active and experience positive affects
such as energy and zeal
Table B1: Big 5 personality traits
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Female Male
Mean Kruskal-Wallis Mean Kruskal-Wallis
Reflective Impulsive Residual p-value Reflective Impulsive Residual p-value
Left hand 2D:4D 0.981 0.986 0.993 0.668 0.965 0.976 0.970 0.050**
Rightt hand 2D:4D 0.975 0.984 0.989 0.494 0.964 0.972 0.971 0.366
Neuroticism 0.538 0.548 0.506 0.612 0.394 0.459 0.418 0.035**
Extraversion 0.601 0.576 0.617 0.497 0.574 0.645 0.553 0.000***
Openness 0.773 0.682 0.686 0.007*** 0.706 0.714 0.677 0.008***
Agreeableness 0.727 0.679 0.685 0.324 0.681 0.692 0.650 0.001***
Conscientiousness 0.731 0.688 0.702 0.382 0.672 0.688 0.661 0.148
Family education 0.446 0.394 0.473 0.295 0.521 0.370 0.488 0.002***
(1+ parent uni. degree)
N. languages >2 0.414 0.430 0.471 0.885 0.453 0.297 0.286 0.080*
Table B2: Means of individuals’ characteristics and p-values of Kruskal-Wallis test of differences among CRT groups. *** p <0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Full sample Female Male
Reflective - Impulsive - Reflective - Impulsive - Reflective - Impulsive -
Impulsive Residual Residual Impulsive Residual Residual Impulsive Residual Residual
Left hand 2D:4D 0.011*** 0.014** 0.366 0.830 0.415 0.417 0.022** 0.080* 0.649
Right hand 2D:4D 0.025** 0.073* 0.792 0.339 0.208 0.653 0.144 0.575 0.843
Neuroticism 0.002*** 0.069* 0.485 0.997 0.381 0.352 0.015** 0.051* 0.893
Extraversion 0.321 0.574 0.071* 0.486 0.877 0.287 0.025** 0.210 0.000***
Openness 0.070* 0.005*** 0.031** 0.002*** 0.022** 0.917 0.808 0.014** 0.002***
Agreeableness 0.573 0.023** 0.009*** 0.134 0.291 0.789 0.721 0.004*** 0.000***
Conscientiousness 0.981 0.252 0.271 0.160 0.434 0.730 0.413 0.187 0.062*
Family education 0.001*** 0.815 0.014** 0.342 0.701 0.160 0.001*** 0.607 0.058*
(1+ parent uni. degree)
N. languages >2 0.214 0.508 0.781 0.876 0.654 0.664 0.033** 0.134 0.907
Table B3: Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon p-values of differences in means of individuals’ characteristics among CRT groups. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure B1: Second to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) histogram by gender.
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Appendix C
Random lottery pairs (RLP) protocol Multiple price list (MPL) protocol
Female 0.606∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.099∗
(0.014) (0.025) (0.051) (0.056)
Reflective (R) 0.508∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.028) (0.054) (0.060)
Impulsive (I) 0.571∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.026) (0.045) (0.048)
Residual (RS) 0.502∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.131
(0.047) (0.034) (0.078) (0.083)
P-val R = I 0.012∗∗ 0.093∗ 0.643 0.520
P-val R = RS 0.914 0.483 0.667 0.583
P-val I = RS 0.154 0.618 0.914 0.910
Obs.s 9,168 9,216 9,168 3,969 3,969 3,969
Table C1: Risk aversion by CRT group: structural estimation using data from RLP
and MPL protocols.
Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. P-values are from t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the difference in risk aversion
between two CRT groups is equal to zero. The total number of observations is the product between
the number of subjects and the number of lottery choices per subject.
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Random lottery pairs (RLP) protocol Multiple price list (MPL) protocol
Female -0.075∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.065∗∗ -0.069∗∗ -0.083∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.035)
Reflective (R) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.042 -0.001 -0.020 -0.044
(0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035)
Residual (RS) 0.035 0.017 0.063 0.002 0.002 0.011
(0.030) (0.029) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039)
Female * R 0.028 0.085
(0.042) (0.071)
Female * RG -0.091 -0.017
(0.057) (0.078)
Constant 0.483∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.518∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.017) (0.021) (0.016) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023)
P-val R = RS 0.304 0.276 0.637 0.955 0.615 0.181
P-val R = I fem. 0.024∗∗ 0.511
P-val R = RS fem. 0.276 0.023∗∗ 0.574
Obs.s 382 384 382 382 186 186 186 186
Table C2: OLS estimation of risky choices using data from RLP and MPL protocols.
Means of risky choices by subjects over the number of lotteries played are used. In RLP subjects
play 24 lotteries and the risky option in each of them is the one with the highest variance. In MPL
the subjects play 21 lotteries and the share of risky choices is computed as the relative frequency
of risky lottery options chosen. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. P-values are from t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the difference in risk aversion
between two CRT groups is equal to zero. The total number of observations is the product between
the number of subjects and the number of lottery choices per subject.
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(1) (2) (3)
Coefficients for α
Female 0.295∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.041) (0.048)
Reflective (R) 0.116∗∗ 0.092∗
(0.048) (0.049)
Impulsive (I) 0.295∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.046)
Residual (RS) 0.237∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.078)
P-val R=I 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
P-val R=RS 0.177 0.234
P-val I=RS 0.441 0.379
Coefficients for β
Female 0.724∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗
(0.038) (0.058)
Reflective (R) 0.533∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.054)
Impulsive (I) 0.760∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.054)
Residual (RS) 0.582∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.089)
P-val R=I 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
P-val R=RS 0.626 0.841
P-val I=RS 0.068∗ 0.054∗
Obs. 8,064 8,064 8,064
Table C3: Social preferences by CRT group: Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s structural
estimation.
Maximum likelihood estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. P-values are from t-statistics to test the hypothesis that the difference in social preferences
between two CRT groups is equal to zero.
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Relative frequency of consistent subjects
Reflective Impulsive Residual
Reflective . . .
Impulsive 0.002*** . .
Residual 0.013*** 0.672 .
Number of switches
Reflective Impulsive Residual
Reflective . . .
Impulsive 0.005** . .
Residual 0.108 0.326 .
(a) Full sample
Reflective Impulsive Residual
Reflective . . .
Impulsive 0.031** . .
Residual 0.060* 1.000 .
Reflective Impulsive Residual
Reflective . . .
Impulsive 0.033∗∗ . .
Residual 0.230 0.608 .
(b) Male
Reflective Impulsive Residual
Reflective . . .
Impulsive 0.039** . .
Residual 0.088* 0.591 .
Reflective Impulsive Residual
Reflective . . .
Impulsive 0.113 . .
Residual 0.306 0.408 .
(c) Female
Table C4: P-values of Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests of relative frequency of con-
sistent subjects and number of switches for pairs of CRT groups. *p-value<0.1,
**p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01
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Relative frequency of Number of switches
consistent subjects
Reflective 0.314 0.613
Impulsive 0.511 0.511
Residual group 0.932 0.947
Table C5: P-values of Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests of gender differences in the
relative frequency of consistent subjects and number of switches by CRT group.
*p-value<0.1, **p-value<0.05, ***p-value<0.01
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